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Judicial Review as a Response to Political Posturing
JUSTIN FOX Yale University
MATTHEW C. STEPHENSON Harvard University
W
e use an agency model to analyze the impact of judicial review on the incentives of elected
leaders to “posture” by enacting bold but ill-advised policies. We ﬁnd that judicial review may
exacerbate posturing by rescuing leaders from the consequences of unwise policies, but may
also discourage posturing by alerting voters to unjustiﬁed government action. We further ﬁnd that judges
will defer to the decision of elected leaders unless posturing is sufﬁciently likely. We then show how
judicial review affects voter welfare, both through its effect on policy choice and through its effect on
the efﬁcacy of the electoral process in selecting leaders. We also analyze how the desirability of judicial
review is affected by characteristics of the leaders and the judges.
W
hat is the appropriate role for judicial review
in a democracy? This question has been a
central preoccupation of American constitu-
tional theory (Friedman 2002), and has assumed in-
creasing salience internationally as the power and in-
ﬂuence of courts around the world has grown (Hirschl
2004). Many have defended judicial review as a way to
reduce or correct systematic failures in legislative and
executive decision making— –thereby reducing the di-
vergence between actual policy choices and those that
would prevail in an ideally functioning representative
democracy. Appropriately designed judicial review, on
this view, can be justiﬁed on democratic grounds, even
if judicial review is not itself a democratic institution.
Critics, however, argue that judicial review tends to
exacerbate rather than ameliorate the pathologies of
representative democracy, and that the costs of judicial
review typically exceed whatever beneﬁts it may have.
We analyze judicial review as a potential response to
a particular problem: The incentive of elected ofﬁcials
to “posture” by taking bold but unwarranted action in
response to a perceived emergency in order to appear
competent to the voters. We begin by providing a brief
overview of this potential problem and the debates
over whether judicial review is an appropriate rem-
edy. We then turn to presenting a model of political
agency, without judicial review, to show how this sort
of posturing may arise. We then modify this model by
introducing judicial review.
We show that judicial review has two main effects
on the frequency of posturing. First, judicial review
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may rescue elected ofﬁcials from the consequences of
ill-advised policies, and this “bailout effect” increases
posturing; second, judicial approval or disapproval of
a policy may affect public opinion of the government
that enacted it, and this “legitimation effect” can cut in
the opposite direction— –decreasing posturing. We next
showthatarationaljudge’sreviewstrategydependson
the prevalence of posturing. If posturing is sufﬁciently
rare, then the judge would defer to the elected leader,
whereas if posturing is sufﬁciently common, the judge
would ﬂatly prohibit the problematic government ac-
tion; judges rely on their own judgment only for “inter-
mediate” levels of posturing. We then combine these
partial-equilibrium analyses to assess the net impact of
judicial review.
Finally, we turn to normative considerations, focus-
ing on how judicial review affects voter welfare both
through its effect on policy choice and through its
effect on the efﬁcacy of the electoral process in se-
lecting good leaders. Our welfare analysis illustrates
conditions under which judicial review serves ma-
joritarian interests— –and thereby arguably increases
the “democratic” character of political outcomes, de-
spite the nondemocratic nature of judicial review
itself— –and also conditions under which judicial re-
view, even by well-motivated judges, can make voters
worseoff.Wealsoconsiderhowthedesirabilityofjudi-
cial review is affected by characteristics of the leaders
and the judges. Our results here are sometimes sur-
prising. For example, increasing judicial competence
can sometimes make judicial review less socially de-
sirable. A supplemental online Appendix (available
athttp://www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2011007)con-
tains proofs of all formal propositions in the text.
JUDICIAL REVIEW AS A RESPONSE
TO POSTURING: AN OVERVIEW
The selection of leaders through regular democratic
elections serves many purposes. Among these, perhaps
the most important is the (potential) amelioration of
the principal-agent problem inherent in any system of
political representation because elections allow voters
both to “select good types” (competent leaders who
share the voters’ preferences) and to “sanction poor
performance” (Fearon 1999). Elections, however, are
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not a perfect solution to the political agency problem
and may sometimes have perverse effects: Concerns
about reelection can distort the incentives of political
leaders, causing them to adopt policies that improve
the leaders’ short-term popularity, but that are actually
worse for a majority of voters. For example, an elected
leader may “pander” by adopting whatever policy the
voters believe ex ante is more likely to be correct, even
though the leader’s own information suggests other-
wise (Canes-Wrone, Herron, and Shotts 2001). Thus,
elected leaders may be too timid if they are concerned
that unexpected policy initiatives will be perceived as
a sign of incompetence or bias. In other contexts, elec-
toral pressures may have precisely the opposite per-
verse effect: A leader may have an incentive to “pos-
ture” by taking some bold, dramatic action in order
to appear competent to voters, even though the leader
is insufﬁciently conﬁdent that such dramatic action is
warranted.1 Such posturing might be especially likely
when the polity is confronted with a perceived emer-
gency, such as an economic or national security crisis.
In such cases, leaders face tremendous pressure to “do
something,”evenwhenmisguidedactionmaybeworse
than no action at all. Thus, a leader who lacks enough
information to justify a given dramatic policy initiative
might nonetheless propose it, lest voters perceive the
leader as insufﬁciently competent to handle the crisis.
Critics have claimed that the latter tendency is ev-
ident in the response to perceived national security
crises, such as the September 11, 2001 terrorist at-
tacks. As Swire (2004, 1349) argues, “When a crisis
hits,...there are strong pressures to ‘do something’ to
respond to the threat. At that instant,...[l]egislation
thatwouldnototherwisebeenacted[duetoitsadverse
impact on civil liberties] thereby becomes law.” Other
critics have likewise asserted that the desire of elected
leaders to appear competent in the face of economic
hardship often leads to ill-advised regulatory interven-
tions. Pierce (1991, 9) offers the price controls adopted
in response to the oil crisis of the 1970s as an example
of the general phenomenon that “when Congress re-
sponds to intense pressure to ‘do something’ to solve
a problem that is widely believed to be critical, the
‘something’ it does is often counterproductive.” Sim-
ilar arguments have been leveled against the govern-
mentresponsetorecentcorporateaccountingscandals
(Ramirez 2007; Romano 2005).
To be clear, we take no position in this article on
the appropriateness of any of these particular policies.
Although bold government action in response to a per-
ceived crisis is sometimes ill-advised and counterpro-
ductive posturing, such actions are sometimes justiﬁed
by the nature of the emergency. The problem is that
it is difﬁcult to tell. For that reason, a rational insti-
tutional designer might want to supplement elections
with some other mechanism to constrain (or correct
for) the perverse incentives that electoral pressures
1 This “posturing” is a variant on what Levy (2004) describes more
generally as “anti-herding.” We use the shorthand “posturing” to
describe this behavior, although we recognize that the term is often
used in a different sense.
can sometimes create. One such mechanism is judi-
cial review by independent courts. Cole (2008, 1341)
advances this argument, in the national security con-
text, as follows: “[D]emocracies and political ofﬁcials
will often be tempted to take actions that appear to
offer short-term beneﬁts even if they are contrary to
our collective long-term interests. Politicians by insti-
tutional design think in the short term.... Inscribing
commitments in a constitution, enforceable by judges
whoneednotworryaboutreelection,isaninstitutional
way to encourage consideration of long-term as well as
short-term effects.” Other scholars have made simi-
lar claims (Eisgruber 2001). On this view, even though
judicial review is “undemocratic” when considered in
isolation, judicial review might enhance rather than
undermine the degree to which policy choices reﬂect
the interests of a majority of voters.2
Yet, even if one concedes that elections sometimes
create the perverse incentives suggested previously, ju-
dicial review may not make things better, and may
make things worse (Elhauge 1991; Vermeule 2006;
Waldron 2006). Indeed, the existence of a “democratic
failure” (agency slack between voters and their repre-
sentatives) does not necessarily justify judicial review
any more than the existence of a market failure nec-
essarily justiﬁes government regulation. Critics have
highlighted three reasons why judicial review may not
be an appropriate response to the policy distortions
allegedly created by electoral pressures. The ﬁrst is ju-
dicial bias: Judges may have the “wrong” preferences
and use their review power in ways that harm voter
interests. The second problem is judicial incompetence:
Even well-motivated judges may lack the capacity to
evaluate the moral and empirical questions at stake in
any hard case, such that whatever beneﬁts ﬂow from
correct judicial decisions may be outweighed by the
costsoferroneousdecisions.Third,followingaconcern
raised by Thayer (1893), some critics warn of a kind of
judicial overhang (Tushnet 1999) or “moral hazard”
(Rogers 2009; Vermeule 2006): Judicial review may
cause elected politicians to pay less attention to certain
constitutionally protected values because the legisla-
tors overrely on the courts to address such concerns.
So, we confront a difﬁcult question: When will ju-
dicial review serve voters’ interests by ameliorating
the distorting effects of short-term electoral incen-
tives on political behavior, and when will judicial re-
view do more harm than good? We develop a political
economyframeworkforaddressingthisquestion.3 The
complexity of the topic means that our contribution is
2 Of course, this is not the only possible justiﬁcation for “undemo-
cratic” judicial review. Many have argued, for example, that judicial
review protects basic moral principles and the rights of vulnerable
minorities (or diffuse majorities) against the depredations of the ma-
jorityorinﬂuentialinterestgroups(Dworkin1985;Ely1980;Sunstein
1984,1985).Judicialreviewmightalsopreventantidemocratic“lock-
ups”ofthepoliticalprocessbyincumbents(Ely1980;Issacharoffand
Pildes1998).Weacknowledgethesepossibilities,butputthemtoone
side in order to focus on the particular argument for judicial review
developed in the text.
3 Despite the vast legal literature on judicial review, relatively little
political economy work engages this problem directly. Most demo-
craticaccountabilitymodelsfocusontherelationshipbetweenvoters
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necessarily limited. Instead of considering the myriad
possible problems that judicial review might plausibly
redress, we focus on the incentive that elections create
for an incumbent politician to posture by taking bold
policy gambles in order to appear competent. Also,
although we explicitly incorporate the concern about
judicialincompetence,andendogenouslyderiveresults
related to judicial overhang, we do not incorporate
the judicial bias concern. Although these limitations
mean that our analysis omits several important issues
in debates over judicial review, limiting our analysis
in this way allows us to focus on other important is-
sues without the loss of clarity inherent in a “model of
everything.”
POLITICAL POSTURING WITHOUT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Baseline Model
In the baseline model, there is a single Voter and a sin-
gle elected Leader. The Leader must select one of two
policies, a ∈{ n,x}, where a = n denotes a “normal”
policy and a = x denotes an “extraordinary” policy.
One can conceive of the “normal” policy as the status
quo; a Leader who selects a = n has decided to “stay
thecourse.”The“extraordinary”policycanbethought
ofassomeextremepolicychoice(e.g.,anintrusivegov-
ernment surveillance program, price controls, seizure
of private property) that is usually unwise (from the
Voter’s and the Leader’s perspective), but that might
be justiﬁed under unusual circumstances. Formally, the
policy the Voter would prefer depends on the state of
theworld,ω ∈{ n,x},whereω = ndenotesa“normal”
state and ω = x denotes an “extraordinary” state. For
simplicity,weassumetheVoterreceivesapolicypayoff
of1ifthepolicymatchesthestate(a = ω),andapayoff
of0otherwise.Thepriorprobabilityofthenormalstate
isp > 1
2,sotheVoterprefersthenormalpolicyexante.
The Leader’s information about the state depends on
his type, t ∈{ l,h},which we willrefer to as his “ability.”
If the Leader is low ability (or “incompetent”) (t = l),
thenhisinformationisnobetterthantheVoter’s;sucha
Leader knows only the prior probability of the normal
state (p). The high-ability (or “competent”) Leader
(t = h), in contrast, learns the true state with certainty.
The Leader knows his own ability, but the Voter knows
only the prior probability q ∈ (0,1) that the Leader is
competent.
and elected agents (e.g., Austen-Smith and Banks 1989; Persson,
Roland, and Tabellini 1997), whereas most models of judicial re-
view employ a separation-of-powers framework that suppresses the
accountability relationship with voters (e.g., Ferejohn and Shipan
1990; Tsebelis 2002). Some important work compares decision mak-
ing by an elected ofﬁcial to decision making by an unelected judge
(Komesar1994;MaskinandTirole2004),butthequestionofwhether
a judge or a politician should make a decision is distinct from the
question of whether a judge should review a politician’s decision.
Some prior political economy work does investigate how judicial
review might affect outcomes in a political agency framework (e.g.,
Posner2008;Rogers1999,2009;RogersandVanberg2007);ourwork
builds on this strand in the literature.
After the Leader selects the policy a, the Voter up-
dates her assessment of the probability the Leader is
competent. Denote the Voter’s posterior estimate of
this probability as ˆ q(a). This posterior belief can be
thought of as the Leader’s reputation, with higher or
lower values of ˆ q indicating “better” or “worse” rep-
utations, respectively. There is then an election.4 We
assume that, all else equal, the Voter’s expected utility
in future periods (which we do not model explicitly) is
an increasing function of the competence of the win-
ning candidate, so the Voter is more likely to reelect
an incumbent with a good reputation. Thus, the prob-
ability that the Leader wins the election is given by
the function F(ˆ q), where F is continuous and strictly
increasing in ˆ q.5 We refer to F(ˆ q) as the Leader’s elec-
toral strength. The better the Leader’s reputation, the
greater his electoral strength.
The Leader shares the Voter’s policy preferences;
all else equal, the Leader prefers the policy to match
the state (a = ω), receiving a policy payoff of 1 when
a = ω, and 0 otherwise. The Leader, however, also
receives a private beneﬁt from holding ofﬁce (e.g.,
ego rents or perks). This private beneﬁt, rather than
a difference in policy preferences, creates the agency
problem between the Voter and Leader in our model.6
Because the Leader cares about both policy and re-
election, we write his total utility as αu + (1 − α)i fh e
wins reelection, and as αu otherwise, where u ∈{ 0,1}
istheLeader’spolicypayoff,α ∈ [0,1)istheweightthe
Leader attaches to policy, and (1 − α) is the weight he
attaches to reelection.7 Thus, α is an inverse measure
of the Leader’s electoral ambition.
To summarize, the baseline model is as follows:
1. Nature determines the state of the world ω and
the Leader’s underlying ability t.
2. Policy-making phase. The Leader, knowing his
ability, implements a policy a ∈{ n,x}.
3. Election phase. The Voter, knowing the Leader’s
policy choice, draws an inference about the
Leader’sability.Anelectionisthenheld,inwhich
the Leader’s probability of reelection is an in-
creasing function of the probability the Voter as-
signs to the Leader being of high ability.
4 We assume that the Voter does not acquire any additional infor-
mation about the Leader’s competence prior to the election. The
Voter does not, for example, observe whether the chosen policy was
successful.
5 One natural interpretation is that the challenger’s perceived prob-
ability of being high ability, realized after the incumbent’s choice of
a, is a random variable with cumulative distribution function F.
6 We assume that the Leader’s interest in retaining ofﬁce is inde-
pendent of his ability. This assumption, however, may be in tension
with our assumption that the Leader shares the Voter’s policy pref-
erences: one could argue that a low-ability Leader ought to have a
weaker interest in reelection than a high-ability Leader. Although
we acknowledge this possibility, we believe that it is substantively
reasonable to suppose that a politician’s desire for reelection is in-
dependent of his underlying ability.
7 The value of αmight be determined, for instance, by whether the
election is imminent or far off, whether the Leader is eligible to run
forreelectionatall(orwhetherheisconstrainedbyatermlimit),the
importance of the particular policy at issue relative to other matters,
the value of holding ofﬁce, and so forth.
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Before proceeding to the equilibrium analysis, no-
tice that because the low-ability Leader knows only
the prior p > 1
2 that ω = n, the low-ability Leader
maximizes the Voter’s policy payoff by selecting a = n.
(Even in a crisis, voters would prefer an incompetent
leader to “stay the course” rather than taking action
that is likely to prove counterproductive.) In contrast,
because the high-ability Leader knows the state, he
maximizes the Voter’s payoff by matching policy to the
state.
Equilibrium
Our solution concept is Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium.
Weassumethehigh-abilityLeaderalwaysproposesthe
policy that matches the state.8 Hence, to solve for an
equilibrium,wesolveforthelow-abilityLeader’sequi-
librium strategy and the Voter’s equilibrium beliefs,
where the low-ability Leader’s strategy is a probability,
π, of selecting the extraordinary policy. A strategy-
belief pair is an equilibrium if (1) the low-ability
Leader’s policy choice (as prescribed by his strategy)
maximizeshisexpectedpayoffgiventheVoter’sbeliefs,
and (2) for each policy choice a, the Voter’s posterior
beliefthattheLeaderishigh-ability, ˆ q(a),isderivedvia
Bayes’ Rule when possible.
Recall that the Voter would like the low-ability
Leader always to propose the normal action, so the
Voter is best off policywise when the low-ability
Leader’s strategy assigns zero probability to the ex-
traordinary action (π = 0). Our main result in this sec-
tion establishes, however, that if the Leader cares suf-
ﬁciently about reelection, there does not exist an equi-
librium in which π = 0. To see why, suppose the high-
ability Leader matches policy to the state and the low-
ability Leader always selects the normal action. Then,
when the Voter observed the extraordinary action, she
would infer that the Leader’s ability is high (ˆ q(x) = 1);
incontrast,whentheVoterobservedthenormalaction,
she would place positive weight on the Leader’s ability
being low (ˆ q(n) =
pq
pq+(1−q)). So, given the conjectured
strategies, the Leader maximizes his reputation for
being high ability— –and so maximizes his probability
of reelection— –by selecting the extraordinary action.
However, this means that if the low-ability Leader
cares sufﬁciently about reelection (i.e., α is small), it
is not optimal for him always to select the normal ac-
tion.Thus,ifLeadershavesufﬁcientelectoralambition,
in any equilibrium in which the high-ability Leader
matches policy to the state, the low-ability Leader’s
equilibriumstrategymustassignpositiveprobabilityto
selecting the extraordinary action (π > 0). This is true
despite the fact that selecting the extraordinary action
involves the low-ability Leader incurring a net policy
c o s to f( 2 p − 1).9 Our ﬁrst proposition establishes that
8 This simpliﬁes the exposition. We verify in the supplemental on-
line Appendix (http://www.journals.cambridge.org/psr2011007), that
matching policy to the state is consistent with equilibrium behavior
for the high-ability Leader.
9 The low-ability Leader’s expected policy payoffs from the normal
actionandextraordinary actionarep and1 − p,respectively.Hence,
thelow-abilityLeader’sequilibriumprobabilityoftak-
ing uninformed extraordinary action, π∗
norev, is positive
when he cares sufﬁciently about getting reelected, but
decreases as he cares more about policy.
Proposition 1. Deﬁne
¯ α ≡
F(1) − F

pq
pq+(1−q)

2p − 1 + F(1) − F

pq
pq+(1−q)

In the absence of judicial review, the equilibrium prob-
ability with which the low-ability Leader proposes ex-
traordinary action, π∗
norev, is uniquely deﬁned. Further-
more, we have that
a. π∗
norev = 1 − p whenever the low-ability Leader
cares only about reelection (α = 0).
b. π∗
norev is strictly decreasing in α on the interval
[0, ¯ α).
c. π∗
norev = 0 whenever α ≥ ¯ α.10
We can interpret π∗
norev as a measure of “postur-
ing.”Inanideallyfunctioningdemocracy,ahigh-ability
Leader would match the action to the state, whereas
a low-ability Leader would always select the normal
action. In the equilibrium described in Proposition 1,
the high-ability Leader behaves as he should, but the
low-ability Leader may not. When π∗
norev > 0, the low-
ability Leader’s electoral interests lead him sometimes
to select the extraordinary action despite the absence
of sufﬁcient evidence that doing so is in the public
interest— –indeed, despite the fact that the Leader him-
self expects a lower policy payoff from the extraordi-
nary action than from the normal action.11 Thus, π∗
norev
the net expected policy payoff to the low-ability Leader from the
extraordinary action is 1 − 2p.
10 It is straightforward to show that the effect of q on π∗
norev is am-
biguous.
11 This result is a variant on Levy’s (2004) analysis of “anti-herding”
(see also Avery and Chevalier 1999; Prendergast and Stole 1996).
As noted previously, a closely related family of models generates
“pandering” behavior in which a less competent leader’s reputa-
tional interest causes him to select the policy the voters believe
ex ante is more likely to be correct (Canes-Wrone, Herron, and
Shotts 2001; Prat 2005; Prendergast 1993). The principal difference
between these two classes of models concerns the quality of the less
competent leader’s information. In pandering models, even a less
competent leader gets a sufﬁciently reliable signal that, but for elec-
toral incentives, he would prefer to follow his signal. Furthermore, in
these models, the conditional probability that the low-ability leader
gets the wrong signal is equal (or nearly equal) for all states. These
assumptions mean that in the absence of electoral incentives less
competent leaders disproportionately prefer the policy that is ex
ante less likely to be correct. In contrast, in posturing models, the
lesscompetentleader’ssignalisinsufﬁciently strong toalterhisprior
belief about the state; thus, absent electoral incentives, less compe-
tent leaders disproportionately prefer the policy favored by their
prior. As should be clear from the comparison, the basic dynamic
underlying both types of models is essentially the same: When less
competent leaders disproportionately prefer one policy, they have
an electoral incentive to choose the other policy, lest voters infer
from the leader’s choice that he is incompetent. We therefore expect
that our analysis of the impact of judicial review would be similar
in a pandering model, although we defer full consideration to future
research.
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measures the degree to which the Leader’s interest
in reelection distorts his equilibrium behavior away
from what one would observe in an ideally functioning
representative democracy.12
SuchposturingbehaviorhurtstheVoterintwoways.
First, and most obviously, absent additional informa-
tion, the extraordinary action has a negative expected
policy payoff. Second, the distortion in the low-ability
Leader’s behavior can make the electoral mechanism
a less efﬁcient means for the Voter to select competent
Leaders because the incumbent Leader’s action pro-
vides less information to the Voter about the Leader’s
ability.13 One solution to the former problem might be
toeliminatetheelectoralconstraint(say,byimposinga
termlimit)ortokeepthepolicydecisionsecretuntilaf-
tertheelection(Fox2007;Prat2005).Suchapproaches,
however, would further undermine the capacity of the
electoral system to improve the average competence
of Leaders over time and could have other adverse
consequences as well. For these reasons, institutional
designers might contemplate other mechanisms that
preserve the system of selecting the Leader via com-
petitive elections, but reduce or compensate for the
distortioninducedbythelow-abilityLeader’selectoral
incentives.Judicialreviewmaybeonesuchmechanism.
POLITICAL POSTURING WITH
JUDICIAL REVIEW
Modiﬁed Game
Now that we have isolated a particular form of elec-
torally induced distortion, we can analyze the impact
of judicial review by modifying the baseline model as
follows: After the Leader selects action a, but prior
to the election, the Leader’s proposed action is re-
viewed by a Judge.14 The Judge issues a decision
d ∈{ uphold,strike}; if the Judge upholds the Leader’s
proposal (d = uphold), the Leader’s proposed action
is implemented, but if the Judge strikes down the
Leader’s proposal (d = strike), the Judge imposes the
alternative policy as the ﬁnal outcome (i.e., if a = x
and d = strike, then the ﬁnal policy is n). Our analysis
incorporates, in stylized fashion, three characteristics
of judicial review that are often cited as important
distinctions between judicial review and other forms
of oversight or institutional control.
First, the Judge in our model has the power to strike
down the Leader’s action, but cannot implement a
12 Notice that the probability that the ﬁnal policy does not match the
state is equal to (1 − q)[pπ∗
norev + (1 − p)(1 − π∗
norev)], and because
p > 1
2, this probability is strictly increasing in π∗
norev.
13 To illustrate with an extreme case, if π∗
norev = 1 − p, then low-
ability and high-ability Leaders select a = x with equal probabilities,
and the Voter learns nothing about the Leader’s type from his policy
choice.
14 Because there is usually some litigant willing to challenge signif-
icant and controversial policy decisions, we make the simplifying
assumption that judicial review is automatic. We later consider, in-
formally, how one might endogenize the review process, such that
review only arises if a litigant makes the strategic decision to chal-
lenge government action. The subsequent analysis also notes how
the results might change if review occurs only after the election.
morereﬁnedincentiveschemethatoffersvariablepay-
ments or penalties to the Leader that depend on the
Leader’s proposal. This is consistent with conventional
understandings of the nature and limits of judicial
power,andcapturesoneofthewaysthatjudicialreview
of government action is believed to differ from, for
example, legislative oversight of a bureaucratic agency,
or a ﬁrm’s supervision of its employees.15
Second, we assume that the Judge is insulated both
from popular elections and direct interference by the
Leader, and that the Judge does not consider how her
decisions will affect the election.16
Third, we incorporate the concern about (relative)
judicial incompetence by assuming that although the
Judge’s analysis of a proposed government action con-
veyssomedecision-relevantinformation(i.e.,informa-
tion about the true state), the Judge’s information is
never by itself strong enough to overcome the Judge’s
prior beliefs. We model this by assuming that after the
Leader proposes action a, the Judge gets a private sig-
nal s ∈{ n,x} of the state of the world. The probability
that the Judge’s signal is accurate (i.e., s = ω), which
is independent of the state, is γ ∈ [1
2,p). The signal
s can be interpreted as a reduced-form expression of
the Judge’s assessment of the evidence proffered by
attorneysduringlitigationproceedings.17 The γparam-
eter, which is common knowledge, can be interpreted
as the Judge’s “ability.”18 The assumption that γ < p
15 A strain in legal scholarship has challenged this assumption, ar-
guing that judicial review can sometimes raise the costs of enacting
certain government policies without necessarily prohibiting them
(Stephenson 2008; Young 2000). As we show in the working paper
version of this article (Fox and Stephenson 2009), if the Judge in
our model were able to raise the cost of enacting a = x, then judicial
review could eliminate the posturing problem. That said, there are
a number of potential obstacles— –including the problems of credible
commitment and accurate calibration— –that may limit the applicabil-
ity of such a strategy. It is thus reasonable to analyze settings where
the Judge must make a simple yes-or-no decision as to whether to
uphold the Leader’s proposal.
16 Although there is evidence that judges are sensitive to public
opinionandaremindfulofthepoliticalandelectoralrepercussionsof
their decisions (Friedman 2009; Schauer 2000), these considerations
probablymattermuchlesstolife-tenured,politicallyinsulatedjudges
thantheydotoelectedpoliticians.Wecapturethisrelativedifference,
instylizedform,bystipulatingthattheJudgecaresonlyaboutgetting
the correct answer in the case before her.
17 We assume that although court proceedings may be public, the
signal s (the Judge’s assessment of the evidence, as distinct from
the evidence itself) is the Judge’s private information. Although the
Judge in principle could choose to reveal her signal— –for instance, by
includingitinherwrittenopinion— –webelievethatitisreasonableto
presumesremainsprivateinformation.First,actualcasedispositions
arelikelytobemoresalientformostvotersthanthedetailsofagiven
case opinion. Also, a Judge who defers to the Leader’s proposal
might not have an incentive to disclose her contrary signal because
doing so may be mildly costly and does not affect the case outcome.
Furthermore, if the Judge must pay some small cost to acquire the
signal, then she may not bother to do so if she does not expect her
ultimatedecisiontobeinﬂuencedbytherealizationofs.Theworking
paper version of this article considers how the results change if the
Judge can publicly disclose s (Fox and Stephenson 2009).
18 We treat γas exogenous. Of course, the likelihood that the Judge
draws the correct inference about the true state will depend on,
among other things, the quality of the lawyering on the case and
the Judge’s own decision to invest effort in analyzing the issues
(Stephenson 2011; Tullock 1979). For present purposes, it sufﬁces
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guarantees that the Judge’s signal is never sufﬁcient,
on its own, to overcome the prior presumption that
the normal action is correct.19 Also, the Judge does not
know the Leader’s true type, but knows only the prior
probability, q, that the Leader is competent.
We further assume that the Judge cares only about
policy, and like the Voter, receives a payoff of 1 if the
policy matches the state, and a payoff of 0 otherwise.
This assumption is potentially vulnerable to two criti-
cisms. First, our model does not explicitly incorporate
speciﬁcallylegalconstraintsonhowajudgeevaluatesa
governmentdecision;judgesmayoftencareaboutlegal
rulesthathavelittletodowithpolicyconsequences.Yet
many of the most salient forms of constitutional (and
nonconstitutional) judicial review, both in the United
States and elsewhere, call on judges to decide whether
a particular government action is “reasonable,” “sup-
ported by a compelling interest,” “proportional,” and
the like; judicial review under these relatively open-
ended balancing inquiries is broadly consonant with
how we model it here. The second and more serious
difﬁculty with our assumption that the Judge prefers
to match policy to the state is that our model does not
incorporate the judicial bias problem that is central in
many debates about judicial review. We acknowledge
this as an important limitation of our analysis. That
said, we also assume that the Leader shares the Voter’s
policy preferences. These assumptions, taken together,
mean that our model investigates costs and beneﬁts
of judicial review that arise from sources other than
preference divergence.20
To summarize, the modiﬁed game is as follows:
1. Nature determines the state of the world ω and
the Leader’s underlying ability t.
2. Policy-making phase. The Leader, knowing his
ability, proposes a policy a ∈{ n,x}.
3. Judicial review phase. The Judge, knowing the
Leader’s policy proposal a and her own signal
s, issues a decision d, either upholding or striking
down the Leader’s proposal. If the Judge upholds
the proposal, then it is implemented; otherwise,
the alternative policy is implemented.
4. Election phase. The Voter, knowing the Leader’s
policy choice and the Judge’s decision, draws an
inference about the Leader’s ability. An election
is then held in which the Leader’s probability of
reelection is an increasing function of the prob-
ability the Voter assigns to the Leader being of
high ability.
to treat γ as the equilibrium accuracy of the Judge’s signal when
these other decisions have been made rationally.
19 Formally, γ< p implies that Pr(ω= n|s = x) > 1
2. This means
that a Judge whose only information beyond her prior (p) about the
stateisasignalofs = xstillbelievesthatω= nisthethemorelikely
state.
20 Wedonotbelievethatthisundulystacksthedeckfororagainstju-
dicial review: The assumption that the Judge prefers to match policy
to the state rules out one common argument against judicial review,
but the assumption that the Leader also prefers (on policy grounds)
to match policy to the state rules out one common justiﬁcation for
review.
Before proceeding to the equilibrium analysis, we
note that even in the Judge’s presence, the Voter’s
policy payoff is maximized when the high-ability
Leader matches policy to the state and the low-
ability Leader selects the normal policy. That the low-
abilityLeadershouldneverselecttheextraordinaryac-
tion follows from our assumptions that the low-ability
Leader knows only the prior that ω = n when propos-
ing policy and that the Judge’s signal of the state is not
strong enough on its own to support implementing the
extraordinary action (i.e., γ < p).21,22
Equilibrium
As before, we assume the high-ability Leader always
proposes the policy that matches the state (a = ω).
We also assume that there is no judicial review if the
Leader proposes the normal action (i.e., if the Leader
proposes no change from the status quo). That is, only
extraordinaryproposalsare“justiciable.”23 To solve for
anequilibriumundertheseassumptions,wemustsolve
fortheprobabilitythatthelow-abilityLeaderproposes
the extraordinary action, and for the behavior of the
Judge on observing such a proposal. As before, we
denote the low-ability Leader’s strategy by the prob-
ability π that he chooses the extraordinary action. We
write the Judge’s strategy as (σn,σ x), where σn is the
probability that the Judge upholds the extraordinary
action even though her signal favors the normal action
(s = n),whereasσx istheprobabilitythattheJudgeup-
holds the extraordinary action when her signal favors
the extraordinary action (s = x).
We must also specify beliefs. As in the baseline
model,denotetheVoter’sposteriorabouttheLeader’s
ability when the normal action is proposed as ˆ q(n).
However, in contrast to the baseline model, denote the
Voter’s posterior about the Leader’s ability when the
extraordinary action is proposed as ˆ q(x,d), where d
denotes the Judge’s decision to either uphold or strike
21 In contrast, if γ> p, then the low-ability Leader has a policy
incentivetopassherdecisionofftotheJudge,instructingtheJudgeto
determine policy based upon her signal. Moreover, in the event that
only the extraordinary action is justiciable, assuming γ> p would
lead to a situation in which the low-ability Leader might take un-
informed extraordinary action simply to bring the expertise of the
Judge to bear on the question. We do not consider this case in the
main text, but we show in the online Appendix that our welfare re-
sults concerning the negative consequences of review— –namely, that
the voter can be worse off policywise with review than without— –can
hold even when γ> p.
22 Although we focus principally on judicial review in what follows,
we note that our analysis may have broader application to any over-
sight scheme in which one agent, subject to electoral pressures or
other career concerns, makes a decision that can be reviewed by a
second agent who lacks such career concerns, but who may not have
asgoodinformation.Forexample,ouranalysismightapplytoreview
of local democratic decisions by a national or supranational agent
that may lack local knowledge, but that has less incentive to seek
popularity with the local electorate.
23 Thisassumption,whichisoftenempiricallyplausible,simpliﬁesthe
exposition. We show in the online Appendix that this assumption is
benign because, even if a = n were justiciable, the Judge would al-
ways uphold the normal policy provided that the high-ability Leader
follows his signal.
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the extraordinary action. Thus, with review, the Voter
takes account not only of the Leader’s proposal, but
also the Judge’s decision, when forming beliefs about
the Leader’s type. In addition to specifying beliefs for
the Voter, we must also specify beliefs for the Judge. In
particular, in deciding whether to uphold the extraor-
dinary action, the Judge must update her prior that
the state is normal based upon her signal (s) and the
fact that the extraordinary action has been proposed.
Denote this posterior ˆ p(s).
The strategies of the low-ability Leader and the
Judge, together with the beliefs of the Judge and the
Voter, constitute an equilibrium if (1) the low-ability
Leader’s policy choice (as prescribed by his strategy)
maximizes his expected payoff given the Judge’s strat-
egyandtheVoter’sposteriorbeliefsabouttheLeader’s
competence; (2) for each private signal s ∈{ n,x},t h e
Judge’s ruling (as prescribed by her strategy) maxi-
mizes her expected payoff given her posterior belief
about the state; and (3) beliefs (of the voter and the
Judge) are derived via Bayes’ Rule whenever possi-
ble.24
Our equilibrium analysis proceeds in three stages.
First, we characterize the equilibrium behavior of the
Leader, taking the Judge’s strategy as exogenous. This
partial-equilibrium analysis allows us to assess the ef-
fect of aggressive judicial review on the level of postur-
ing. Second, we characterize the equilibrium behavior
oftheJudge,takingtheLeader’sstrategyasexogenous.
This partial-equilibrium analysis clariﬁes how the level
of posturing affects the aggressiveness with which the
Judge reviews the Leader’s proposals. Third, we com-
bine these partial-equilibrium analyses to characterize
the equilibria of the judicial review game.
Effect of the Judge’s Review Strategy on the Level
of Posturing. Although our model does not permit a
comprehensive assessment of the effects of judicial re-
view, it does allow us to investigate how judicial review
affects the particular form of distortion we isolated
in the previous section: the propensity of low-ability
leaders to “posture” by proposing bold (and probably
unjustiﬁed) action in order to appear competent. We
now consider that question, taking the Judge’s strategy
as exogenous.
Most extant discussions of the effect of judicial re-
view on policy outcomes presume that the reviewing
court makes some independent decision, based on the
court’s own analysis, about whether to uphold the pro-
posed government action. In our model, this would
imply a situation in which the Judge follows her signal,
upholdingtheextraordinarypolicyifs = x,butstriking
itdownifs = n(i.e.,σn = 0,σx = 1).Welabelthisform
of judicial review as active review. There are two other
24 Becausethehigh-abilityLeaderalwaysmatchespolicytothestate,
x is always chosen with positive probability, so ˆ p can be completely
speciﬁed via Bayes’ Rule. In contrast, it is not always possible to
completely specify ˆ q via Bayes’ Rule. For example, if the Judge’s
strategy calls for her always to uphold the Leader’s proposal of a =
x,t h e nˆ q(x,strike) cannot be derived via Bayes’ Rule. That said,
the low-ability Leader’s incentives are fully determined by on-path
beliefs, so the speciﬁcation of off-path beliefs is inconsequential.
purestrategiestheJudgemightemploy,however.First,
the Judge might adopt a passive approach, upholding
theLeader’sproposalregardlessoftheJudge’sownsig-
nal (i.e., σn = σx = 1). Second, the Judge might employ
a strict review strategy, striking down the extraordi-
nary action in all cases (i.e., σn = σx = 0).25 We refer
to any equilibrium in which the Judge employs an ac-
tive review strategy as an active equilibrium. We deﬁne
passive equilibrium and strict equilibrium analogously.
The low-ability Leader’s equilibrium strategy, condi-
tional on the Judge adopting the active strategy, is de-
noted π∗
act, whereas π∗
pass and π∗
strict denote the Leader’s
equilibrium strategy given passive and strict review,
respectively.
We can now address the question of whether judi-
cial review increases or decreases posturing, taking the
Judge’s review strategy as exogenous:
Proposition 2.
a. Passivereview.Inapassiveequilibrium,posturing
isthesameasinthebaselinemodelwithoutjudicial
review (i.e., π∗
pass = π∗
norev).
b. Strict review. In a strict equilibrium, posturing is
weakly greater than that in the no review case (i.e.,
π∗
strict = 1 − p ≥ π∗
norev).
c. Active review. In an active equilibrium, the level
of posturing, π∗
act, is uniquely deﬁned, and can be
greater than or less than that in the no review case
(i.e.,theorderingofπ∗
act andπ∗
norev isambiguous).26
Part (a) of Proposition 2 is unsurprising: If the Judge
ispassive,themodelwithjudicialreviewisfunctionally
equivalent to the baseline model with no review. Part
(b) is also straightforward: If the Judge uses a strict
review strategy, the ﬁnal outcome is always the normal
policy; because that outcome is a foregone conclusion,
the low-ability Leader’s policy choice is driven solely
by electoral considerations. Thus, in a strict equilib-
rium,thelow-abilityLeaderselectsa = xwiththesame
probability as the high-ability Leader (1 − p). Part (c)
of Proposition 2, concerning the effect of active judi-
cial review, is more complicated and more relevant to
debates over the impact of judicial review on demo-
cratic performance. The reason that active review may
increase or decrease posturing is that active review af-
fects the low-ability Leader’s incentives through two
quite different channels, and these two effects may cut
in opposite directions. One of these effects concerns
the impact of active review on the likely policy conse-
quences if the low-ability Leader proposes the extraor-
dinary action. The other effect concerns the impact of
active review on the likely reputational consequences
for the low-ability Leader who proposes the extraordi-
nary action. Let us consider each in turn.
25 A fourth pure strategy, in which the Judge always does the oppo-
site of her signal, is implausible and never occurs in an equilibrium
in which the high-ability Leader matches policy to the state. We
considerthepossibilitythattheJudgemightemployamixedstrategy
when analyzing the equilibria of the judicial review game.
26 It is straightforward to show that π∗
act is weakly decreasing in α,
but the effects of γand qon π∗
act are ambiguous.
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First, the low-ability Leader’s incentive to propose
extraordinary action depends in part on the expected
policy consequences of making such a proposal. Be-
causetheextraordinaryactionisprobablyabadidea,a
low-abilityLeaderismorelikelytoproposesuchaction
if there is some probability that the Judge will strike
it down. This would be true even if the Judge struck
down proposals at random; the fact that the Judge’s
signal is somewhat informative strengthens the effect.
This “bailout effect” means that active judicial review
tends to increase posturing all else equal (although it
will also correct some erroneous policy choices). This
observation is broadly consistent with the “judicial
overhang” hypothesis that judicial review will make
elected leaders more reckless because they can rely on
courts to screen out objectionable policies. It is also
consistent with the related claim that elected ofﬁcials
aresometimespleased— –perhapsevenrelieved— –when
the courts strike down a policy measure that the enact-
ing ofﬁcials viewed as ill advised, but felt pressured by
electoralintereststopropose(Hirschl2000;Salzberger
1993).
Active review also has a second effect, however: As
long as the Judge’s signal is somewhat informative, ac-
tive review communicates useful information to the
Voter about the true state, which the Voter can use to
update her assessment of the Leader’s competence.27
Call this the “legitimation effect” of active judicial re-
view.28 This effect can dampen the low-ability Leader’s
electoral incentive to propose the extraordinary ac-
tion.29 This is because, holding the low-ability Leader’s
strategy ﬁxed, the introduction of a Judge who em-
ploys an active review strategy reduces the low-ability
Leader’s expected reputation from proposing a = x.
To see why, note that when the Judge overrules the
Leader, the Leader’s reputation suffers; because the
low-ability Leader is more likely to be overruled than
the high-ability Leader, the former’s expected reputa-
tion from proposing a = x is worse than the latter’s.
This fact (taken together with the Martingale property
of Bayesian posteriors30) implies that the low-ability
27 This is similar to how an informative media’s reporting about the
state of the world can affect public perceptions of the competence
of elected ofﬁcials, as discussed in Ashworth and Shotts (2010). A
crucial difference, however, is that the media in their model only
communicate a signal about the state, whereas in our model the
Judge’s decision simultaneously communicates information about
the state and affects the policy outcome directly. This difference
reﬂects an important substantive difference between the media and
the judiciary as constraints on elected ofﬁcials.
28 Although there is little empirical evidence on the question of how
judicial validation or invalidation of a policy affects public opinion
of the ofﬁcials who enacted it, there is suggestive evidence that judi-
cial rulings may affect public evaluations of the policies themselves
(Clawson, Kegler, and Waltenburg 2001; Hoekstra and Segal 1996).
29 IfweassumethattheelectoralstrengthfunctionF isconcave,then
the legitimationeffectwill dampenthe low-ability Leader’selectoral
incentive to propose a = x. In contrast, when F is sufﬁciently con-
vex, the addition of the Judge can increase the low-ability Leader’s
electoral incentive to propose a = x. See the working paper version
of this article (Fox and Stephenson 2009) for further discussion of
this subtlety.
30 The Martingale property of Bayesian posteriors implies that the
Voter’s posterior about the Leader’s ability on observing x pro-
Leader’s expected reputation from proposing a = x is
lower in the presence of active judicial review than in
the case without judicial review.
Thus, active review affects the low-ability Leader’s
incentive to propose a = x via two channels that of-
ten work at cross purposes. On the one hand, the
bailouteffectreduces thepolicycoststothelow-ability
Leader from proposing the extraordinary action. This
makesselectinga = xmoreattractivetothelow-ability
Leader. On the other hand, the legitimation effect can
reduce the low-ability Leader’s electoral beneﬁt from
proposing a = x. Thus, depending on the relative mag-
nitudes of the bailout and legitimation effects, active
review can increase or decrease posturing, relative to
the no review baseline.31
We conclude this subsection by noting that our dis-
cussionsofarhasconsideredonlytheimpactofjudicial
review on the level of posturing, not its potential to
correct for this sort of distortion (as when the Judge
strikes down a low-ability Leader’s incorrect decision)
or its potential to obstruct desirable government ini-
tiatives (as when the Judge incorrectly strikes down an
extraordinary proposal).32 We take up these factors in
the next section.
Effect of Posturing on the Judge’s Review Strategy.
The preceding subsection characterized the behavior
of the Leader, taking the Judge’s review strategy as
ﬁxed. However, the Judge in our model is also a strate-
gic actor. We now investigate the conditions that give
rise to different forms of judicial behavior, temporarily
treating the level of posturing, π, as exogenous.
Begin by considering the Judge’s incentives to up-
hold the extraordinary action when it is proposed.
Because the Judge cares only about policy, her deci-
sion whether to uphold the extraordinary action will
turnonher posterior belief about whichstate— –normal
or extraordinary— –is more likely. The Judge initially
knows only the prior p that the state is normal. How-
ever, at the time the Judge must decide whether to
upholdtheextraordinaryaction,shehastwoadditional
pieces of information at her disposal. The ﬁrst is her
signal, s. Naturally, the Judge assigns more weight to
the state being extraordinary when her signal so indi-
cates (s = x) than when her signal points to the state
being normal (s = n). The second piece of informa-
tion the Judge has when she must decide whether to
posed, ˆ q(x), must equal the Voter’s expected posterior on ob-
serving x proposed and the Judge’s decision d,ˆ q(x)Ed[ˆ q(x,d)|t =
h] + (1 − ˆ q(x))Ed[ˆ q(x,d)|t = l].
31 If our model were modiﬁed such that review occurred after the
election, such review would continue to create some form of bailout
effect, but no legitimation effect. Hence, in such a model, review
would exacerbate posturing relative to the no review baseline. We
note, however, that in the real world, there still might be some form
of legitimation effect from such delayed review if the Leader has an
interest in his reputation beyond its immediate impact on the next
election.
32 Formally, under active review, the probability that the Leader
incorrectly proposes extraordinary action in the normal state is
p(1 − q)π∗
act; the probability that the extraordinary policy is incor-
rectly implemented is (1 − γ)p(1 − q)π∗
act; and the probability that
the active Judge incorrectly strikes down the extraordinary policy in
the extraordinary state is (1 − γ)(1 − p)(q+ (1 − q)π∗
act).
404American Political Science Review Vol. 105, No. 2
FIGURE 1. Judge’s Posterior That the State Is Normal as a Function of her Signal and the
Level of Posturing
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Notes: Suppose that the high-ability Leader matches policy to the state, the low-ability Leader selects the extraordinary action with
probability π, and the Judge observes the extraordinary action proposed. Given that the Judge’s signal of the state s= n,ˆ p(n;·)i st h e
graph of the Judge’s posterior belief that the state is normal as a function of the level of posturing π.ˆ p(x;·) is analogously deﬁned for
the case in which s= x. Given that s= n, T gives the maximal level of posturing π such that the Judge believes that the extraordinary
state is at least as likely as the normal state. T is analogously deﬁned for the case in which s= x. Notice that it is only when π∈ (T,T)
that the Judge’s posterior about which state is more likely hinges on the signal of the state that she receives. For this ﬁgure, we set
p = 0.8, γ= 0.65, and q = 0.45.
uphold the extraordinary action is the fact that the
Leader proposed such action. The Judge knows that
the high-ability Leader proposes extraordinary action
if, but only if, the state is extraordinary. However, the
Judge also knows that the low-ability Leader, who has
no private information regarding the state, proposes
extraordinary action with probability π. It follows that
the strength of the inference the Judge can draw from
the Leader’s proposal of the extraordinary action is
inversely proportional to π. For sufﬁciently low val-
ues of π, the Judge can be quite certain that the state
is extraordinary if the Leader proposed extraordinary
action; however, this becomes less true as π increases.
Thus, increasing the rate of posturing π can only in-
crease the Judge’s incentive to strike the extraordinary
action when it is proposed.
Figure 1 plots the Judge’s posterior belief that the
state is normal as function of both her signal s and
the low-ability Leader’s strategy π. To highlight the
dependency of this posterior on the rate of posturing
π, we write it as ˆ p(s;π).33 Figure 1 indicates two key
thresholds, T and T. When π < T and a = x, the Judge
believes the extraordinary state is more likely than the
33 To be precise, ˆ p(s;π) is the Judge’s posterior belief (derived via
Bayes’ Rule) that ω= n when a = x and her signal is s, given
that the high-ability Leader matches policy to the state and the
low-ability Leader selects a = x with probability π. The online Ap-
pendix establishes that ˆ p(x;π) =
(1−γ)(1−q)πp
(1−γ)(1−q)πp+γ(q+(1−q)π)(1−p) and
that ˆ p(n;π) =
γ(1−q)πp
γ(1−q)πp+(1−γ)(q+(1−q)π)(1−p).
normal state, even if the Judge’s own signal is s = n;
thus, the Judge has a strict incentive to uphold. In
contrast, when π > T and a = x, the Judge believes
the normal state is more likely than the extraordinary
state, even if the Judge’s own signal is s = x; this gives
the Judge a strict incentive to strike down the Leader’s
extraordinary proposal. It is only when π ∈ (T,T) that
the Judge’s posterior about whether the Leader’s ex-
traordinary proposal is justiﬁed depends upon her sig-
nal. For this intermediate range of posturing, the in-
formation contained in the prior (which favors the
normal state) and the information contained in the
Leader’s extraordinary proposal (which favors the ex-
traordinary state) offset sufﬁciently that the Judge’s
own signal becomes decisive. As the next proposition
indicates, the level of posturing π in relationship to the
thresholds T and T determines the Judge’s equilibrium
behavior— –namely, whether she adopts a passive, ac-
tive, or strict strategy.
Proposition 3. Deﬁne the following two threshold
values:
T ≡

q(1 − p)
1 − q

(1 − γ)
p − (1 − γ)
and
T ≡

q(1 − p)
1 − q

γ
p − γ
.
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Inanequilibriuminwhichthelow-abilityLeaderselects
a = x with probability π∗, we have
a. If π∗ < T, then the Judge adopts the passive strat-
egy, upholding a = x regardless of her signal s.
b. If π∗ ∈ (T,T), then the Judge adopts the active
strategy, upholding a = xi fs = x, but striking
a = x when s = n.
c. If π∗ > T, then the Judge adopts the strict strategy,
striking a = x regardless of her signal.
d. Ifπ∗ = T, then the Judge is indifferent between up-
holdingandstrikinga = xwhens = n,butupholds
a = x whenever s = x.
e. If π∗ = T, then the Judge strikes a = x when s = n,
and is indifferent between upholding and striking
a = x when s = x.34
Although we defer a comprehensive consideration
of the welfare effects of judicial review until the next
section, one welfare implication of Proposition 3 is suf-
ﬁciently important (both substantively and for devel-
oping intuition) that we state it here.
Remark1:RationalJudicialActivism TheJudgestrikes
down the extraordinary action only when doing so does
not harm her expected policy payoff, which is identical
to the Voter’s expected policy payoff. Thus, if the level
of posturing (π) is ﬁxed, then judicial review weakly
improvesVoterwelfarerelativetothebaselinenoreview
case.
This result is notable in light of a familiar objection
to judicial review that emphasizes judicial incompe-
tence. One might believe that for sufﬁciently low lev-
els of judicial ability (γ), introducing judicial review
would harm Voter welfare because ignorant Judges
wouldstrikedownpoliciesadoptedbymorecompetent
elected Leaders. Our analysis, however, demonstrates
that low judicial ability is not a sufﬁcient condition
for judicial review to have adverse effects on Voter
welfare. The reason is that, in our model, the Judge,
like Socrates, is aware of the limits of her knowledge,
and she rationally discounts the inferences she draws
from her own signal accordingly. Consequently, when
the Judge’s ability is sufﬁciently low, she tends to defer
to the Leader. Such passive judicial review is irrelevant
but not harmful.35
34 One implication of this proposition is that an equilibrium in which
the Judge uses a mixed strategy can only arise when π∗ = T or π∗ =
T. Even when π∗ = T (π∗ = T), randomizing between upholding
and striking the extraordinary action is consistent with equilibrium
behavior for the Judge only when s = n (s = x).
35 Although the “judicial incompetence” criticism usually empha-
sizes that judges lack information or expertise (i.e., that their signals
areinaccurate),somehavehypothesizedthatjudgesmayalsoexhibit
systematically irrational behavior— –for example, overconﬁdence in
their own signals. The most prominent such hypothesis maintains
that judges are swayed excessively by the individual cases before
them (Schauer 2006; Vermeule 2009). We acknowledge the possibil-
ity that judicial incompetence may lead to worse outcomes in the
presence of this or other forms of judicial irrationality, even if the
judge is unbiased. The extant literature, however, does not always
sharply distinguish arguments about why judges are less informed
Having established that the Judge’s optimal review
strategydependsonthelevelofposturingπinrelation-
ship to T and T, we may be interested in comparative
statics on T and T because changes in these thresholds
can affect the Judge’s review strategy, even holding the
level of posturing ﬁxed. These comparative statics are
as follows.
Remark 2: Impact of Leader and Judge Characteristics
on Judicial Strategy
a. ThelowerthresholdTisdecreasinginjudicialabil-
ity(γ),whereastheupperthresholdTisincreasing
in γ.
b. T and T are independent of the weight the Leader
attaches to policy (α).
c. T and T are both increasing in the probability of a
competent leader (q).
Part (a) implies that as judicial ability (γ) increases,
theinterval[T,T]expands,meaningtheactivestrategy
is optimal for a wider range of posturing levels. This
is intuitive: The more accurate the Judge’s signal, the
greater the Judge’s payoff from relying on it. Part (b)
followsfromthefactthattheJudge’sincentivesarenot
directly affected by parameters of the Leader’s payoff
function.Toseetheintuitionforpart(c),notethatifwe
holdπﬁxedandincreasetheprobabilityofacompetent
Leader, the Judge can draw a stronger inference about
the state from the Leader’s proposal. This makes the
passive strategy more attractive relative to the active
strategy (i.e., T shifts up) and the active strategy more
attractiverelativetothestrictstrategy(i.e.,Tshiftsup).
Equilibria of Judicial Review Game
In this section, we move from our partial-equilibrium
analyses, in which either the Leader or the Judge’s
behavior was taken as exogenous, to a general-
equilibrium analysis in which both the Leader and the
Judge’s behavior is endogenous. Our objective is to
characterize the outcome of the strategic interaction
between the Leader and the Judge as a function of the
model’s underlying parameters. The main result of this
section illuminates how changes in the competence of
the Leader (q) and the Judge (γ) affect the low-ability
Leader’sequilibriumlevelofposturingandtheJudge’s
equilibrium review strategy.36
than other actors from arguments about why judges are systemati-
cally less rational than other actors. As for the speciﬁc argument that
judges attach undue salience to the cases before them, it is not clear
howstrongtheeffectactuallyisrelativetopotentiallycountervailing
considerations, such as the additional information contained in a
particular case or series of cases (Rogers 2001; Sherwin 2006), and
the analogous tendency of elected ofﬁcials to overreact to salient
events (Kuran and Sunstein 1999).
36 Our characterization of the conditions under which passive and
activeequilibriaexistisincomplete,becausetheclosed-formsolution
for the low-ability Leader’s equilibrium strategy in nonstrict equilib-
ria tends to be analytically intractable. This is because the low-ability
Leader’s net expected payoff from proposing a = x is a nonlinear
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CombiningPropositions2and3yieldsconditionsfor
the existence of passive, strict, and active equilibria.
Namely, passive equilibria exist if and only if π∗
pass ≤ T,
strict equilibria exist if and only if T ≤ π∗
strict, and active
equilibriaexistifandonlyifT ≤ π∗
act ≤ T.Thus,thefact
that π∗
pass is bounded above by (1 − p)37 means that a
sufﬁcient condition for passive equilibria is 1 − p ≤ T.
Furthermore, the fact that π∗
strict = 1 − p means that a
necessary and sufﬁcient condition for strict equilibria
isT ≤ 1 − p.Finally,thefactthatπ∗
act isboundedabove
by 1 means that a necessary condition for active equi-
libria to exist is that T ≤ 1. These inequalities, together
withthedeﬁnitionsofTandTinProposition3,allowus
to provide a partial characterization of the respective
regions of the parameter space under which passive,
strict, and active equilibria exist.
Proposition 4.
a. Passiveequilibriaexistifq ≥
p+γ−1
p (i.e.,whenever
thepriorbeliefthattheLeaderishighabilityissuf-
ﬁcientlylargerelativetotheaccuracyoftheJudge’s
signal).
b. Strict equilibria exist if and only if q ≤
p−γ
p (i.e.,
whenever the prior belief that the Leader is high
ability is sufﬁciently small).
c. Activeequilibriaexistonlyifq ≤
p+γ−1
pγ (i.e.,when
the prior belief that the Leader is high ability is not
too large).
d. Equilibria always exist; parameter values exist in
which more than one judicial strategy is consis-
tent with equilibrium behavior; parameter values
also exist in which all equilibria involve the Judge
employing a mixed strategy.
This proposition tells us that equilibria are passive
when the probability of a competent Leader (q)i ss u f -
ﬁciently large. It also tells us that strict equilibria exist
when the probability of a competent Leader is suf-
ﬁciently small. The basic intuition is straightforward:
If most Leaders are high ability, the selection of the
extraordinary proposal is sufﬁciently informative that
itisoptimalfortheJudgetodefertotheLeader.Incon-
trast, when the Leader is likely to be incompetent, the
Judgewillbeconsiderablymoreskepticalofaproposed
extraordinary action. Hence, if q is low and the level
of posturing is high, then the Judge will overrule the
Leader regardless of her signal. Part (c) of Proposition
4 leaves open the possibility of active equilibria (but
only if qis not too large).
To complement our analytic results, we characterize
graphically the conditions under which passive, strict,
and active equilibria exist. In Figure 2, we vary the
Judge’s ability (γ) and the probability of a compe-
tent Leader (q), while holding other parameters ﬁxed.
function of his strategy (see the online Appendix). This nonlinearity
remains even if F, the electoral strength function, is linear.
37 From Proposition 1, we know π∗
norev ≤ 1 − p; from Proposition 2,
we know π∗
pass = π∗
norev. Thus, π∗
pass ≤ 1 − p.
We then use computational methods to solve for the
model’s equilibria over a discrete grid in γ-qspace. For
instance,considertheleftmostpanelinFigure2.Onthe
horizontal axis, we vary γ, and on the vertical axis, we
vary q. The shaded region of this panel identiﬁes those
values of γ and q for which passive equilibria exist.
The center and right panels do the same for strict and
active equilibria, respectively. Consistent with Propo-
sition 4 and the intuitions from our partial equilibrium
analysis (Remark 2), if we ﬁx γ, then a high probability
of a competent Leader (q) facilitates the existence of
passive equilibria, whereas small q gives rise to strict
equilibria. Likewise, and again consistent with the in-
tuitions from Remark 2, if we ﬁx q, then increasing
judicial expertise (γ) facilitates the existence of active
equilibria.
Consideration of the general equilibrium case also
reveals some potentially important features of the
model that are not apparent in the partial-equilibrium
analyses. First, the analysis suggests a possible ex-
planation for the observation— –often framed as a
criticism— –that judicial behavior in many domains
is “unpredictable” (Rose-Ackerman 1988; Tushnet
1979). In our model, equilibrium judicial behavior may
beunpredictablefortworeasons.First,whentheJudge
uses an active review strategy her decision depends on
her signal, which is not known in advance. Second,
our general-equilibrium analysis implies a deeper, and
potentially more interesting, form of unpredictability.
As indicated by part (d) of Proposition 4, for some
parameter values there is no equilibrium in which the
Judge plays a pure strategy (active, passive, or strict).38
In such cases, one cannot be certain how the Judge will
respondtoagivensignalbecauseequilibriumbehavior
involves the Judge using a mixed strategy in which she
randomizes her response to one of the two possible
signals. This sort of uncertainty may be thought of as
uncertainty with respect to the “standard of review”
that the court will apply— –a form of uncertainty often
believed to be particularly problematic. Our model,
however, suggests that this form of unpredictability
may be the consequence of rational and strategic ju-
dicial behavior, rather than judicial carelessness or ne-
glect of long-term consequences.
Our results also imply that for some parameter val-
ues, multiple equilibria may exist. For example, when
T > π∗
act > T > π∗
pass, both active and passive review
are sustainable in equilibrium.39 Whether the active or
passive equilibrium is played when both exist depends
on the equilibrium selection rule, which lies outside
the scope of the model and may be thought of as an
38 Such would be the case, for example, if T ≥ 1 > π∗
pass > T > π∗
act.
In this case, if the Judge adopted an active strategy, posturing would
be sufﬁciently low that a rational Judge would ignore her signal
and always uphold the Leader’s extraordinary proposal (i.e., use a
passive strategy). If the Judge adopted a passive strategy, however,
then posturing would be sufﬁciently frequent that a rational Judge
would follow her signal (i.e., use an active strategy).
39 This possibility is illustrated by Figure 2, in which the intersection
between the set of parameters for which passive equilibria exist and
the set of parameters for which active equilibria exist is nonempty.
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FIGURE 2. Judge’s Equilibrium Strategy as a Function of the Accuracy of her Signal and the Prior Belief That Leader Is of High Ability
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Notes: In each panel, we vary the level of judicial expertise γ along the horizontal axis and the prior q that the Leader is of high ability along the vertical axis, while holding ﬁxed the other
features of the model. The shaded region of the leftmost panel indicates those values of γ and q for which an equilibrium exists in which the Judge adopts a passive strategy. The shaded
regions of the center and right panels indicate those values of γand q for which an equilibrium exists in which the Judge adopts a strict strategy and an active strategy, respectively. For these
simulations, we ﬁx the prior p that the state of the world ω= n and the weight αthat the Leader attaches to policy. In addition, we ﬁx the function F that translates the Leader’s reputation for
being high ability into a probability of reelection. In particular, we set p = 0.8, α= 0.4, and F(ˆ q) = ˆ q.
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aspect— –perhaps a manipulable aspect— –of “legal cul-
ture.”
Finally, this subsection’s general equilibrium anal-
ysis suggests how the process of review itself— –thus
far taken to be exogenous— –might be endogenized. As
currently formulated, whenever the Leader proposes
the extraordinary action, the extraordinary action is
automatically reviewed by the Judge. However, over
the region of the parameter space for which the unique
equilibrium is passive, there is no incentive for the
Judge to hear the case: The Judge knows that regard-
less of her signal, she will uphold the extraordinary ac-
tion. Likewise, parties hurt by the extraordinary action
might be hesitant to bring a case to the court when in
this region of the parameter space because they know
they will lose regardless of the evidence they present.
In contrast, over the region of the parameter space
in which equilibria are nonpassive, aggrieved parties
haveanincentivetobringcases,althoughthisincentive
may be attenuated by other factors, such as litigation
costs. More generally, given that the Judge’s incentive
to adopt a nonpassive strategy depends on the rate of
posturing, our model suggests that litigants (when de-
ciding whether to bring a challenge) and courts (when
deciding whether to hear a challenge) will consider
the potential political calculations that inﬂuence the
adoption of the policy in question.40
WELFARE CONSEQUENCES OF
JUDICIAL REVIEW
We now consider the effect of judicial review on Voter
welfare. In our setup, judicial review may affect Voter
welfare through two distinct channels. First, judicial
review affects the probability that the policy matches
thestate,whichaffectstheVoter’scurrentpolicypayoff.
Second, judicial review affects the Voter’s information
regarding the incumbent Leader’s type, which in turn
affects the efﬁcacy of elections as a device for select-
ing competent leaders. Through this channel, judicial
review may affect the Voter’s future payoff. We con-
sider each effect in turn, remaining agnostic as to their
relative importance.
Policy Effects
Considerﬁrsttheeffectofjudicialreviewontheproba-
bility of a correct policy decision in the current period.
Thefollowingpropositionidentiﬁeshowtheformofju-
dicialreview(passiveornonpassive)affectstheVoter’s
current policy payoff.
Proposition 5.
a. If judicial review induces a passive equilibrium,
then judicial review has no effect on the Voter’s
expected current policy payoff.
b. Ifjudicialreviewinducesanonpassiveequilibrium
in which posturing is lower than (equal to) that in
40 Fully endogenizing the process of case generation and case selec-
tion is beyond the scope of this article.
the no review case, then judicial review improves
(weakly improves) the Voter’s expected current
policy payoff.
c. Ifjudicialreviewinducesanonpassiveequilibrium
in which posturing is greater than that in the no
review case, then the effect of review on the Voter’s
expected current policy payoff is ambiguous.
Part (a) of Proposition 5 is straightforward: In a pas-
sive equilibrium, behavior is identical to the no review
case, so judicial review has no effect. To understand
parts (b) and (c), begin by recalling that when judi-
cialreviewinducesanonpassiveequilibrium,posturing
mayincreaseordecrease.However,holdingthelevelof
posturing ﬁxed, the introduction of judicial review can
never harm the Voter. This is because the Judge shares
the Voter’s policy preferences and strikes the extraor-
dinary action only when doing so beneﬁts the Voter in
expectation (see Remark 1). Thus, nonpassive review
has two distinct effects on the Voter’s expected policy
payoff. First, nonpassive judicial review changes the
probabilitythatthelow-abilityLeaderwillerroneously
propose the extraordinary action in the normal state;
second, nonpassive judicial review will correct some of
these erroneous decisions by striking them down.41 If
judicial review decreases posturing, then both of these
effects cut in the same direction, leading to an unam-
biguous increase in the Voter’s expected policy payoff
[part (b)]. If, however, judicial review increases pos-
turing, these effects cut in opposite directions, making
the net effect of review on the Voter’s current policy
payoff unclear [part (c)].42 Figure 3 extends the exam-
ple used in Figure 2, contrasting the Voter’s current
policy payoff with and without judicial review. Note,
in particular, the rightmost panel. The black region of
this panel indicates those values of γ and q for which
the Voter’s current policy payoff is strictly lower with
review. For such parameters, the level of posturing
without review is not low enough to induce the Judge
to employ a passive strategy; yet, nonpassive review
exacerbates posturing to such an extent that the Voter
fails to beneﬁt from the Judge’s expertise.
Proposition 5, together with Figure 3, provides some
support and some challenges for both defenders and
critics of judicial review. On the one hand, it is possible
in our model for judicial review to worsen Voter
41 Of course, the Judge will also erroneously strike down some justi-
ﬁed extraordinary proposals; however, in equilibrium, the expected
beneﬁtsofcorrectreversalsoutweightheexpectedcostsoferroneous
reversals.
42 Forexample,supposejudicialreviewinducesanactiveequilibrium
inwhichπ∗
act > π∗
norev.Whetherjudicialreviewincreasesordecreases
the Voter’s current policy payoff in this instance turns on whether
judicial review creates more instances of unjustiﬁed extraordinary
actionthanitcorrects, orcorrectsmorethanitcreates.Alternatively,
considerthecaseinwhichjudicialreviewinducesastrictequilibrium
in which π∗
strict > π∗
norev. In a strict equilibrium, the ﬁnal policy is
always n. The cost of strict review is that the Voter no longer beneﬁts
fromthehigh-abilityLeader’sexpertise.ThebeneﬁtisthattheVoter
no longer suffers from the low-ability Leader erroneously proposing
a = x when ω= n. Whether the Voter beneﬁts when review induces
a strict equilibrium thus depends on the relative magnitude of these
costs and beneﬁts.
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FIGURE 3. Effect of Judicial Review on Voter’s Current Policy Payoff
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welfare, despite the fact that the Judge in our model
shares the Voter’s state-contingent policy preferences.
So, judicial bias is not a necessary condition for
judicial review to have adverse effects on democratic
performance: Judicial review may cause a large
increase in posturing (most likely through a strong
bailout effect) that overwhelms whatever beneﬁts may
accrue from judicial correction of erroneous decisions.
This suggests a potentially serious problem with
judicial review that defenders of the institution must
take seriously. On the other hand, our analysis also
highlights important limits to this “judicial overhang”
concern. Increased posturing is not an inevitable
consequence of judicial review— –indeed, with a
sufﬁciently strong legitimation effect, judicial review
can reduce posturing, turning the judicial overhang
argument on its head. Moreover, even if judicial
review does increase posturing, it may correct enough
erroneous policy decisions that the net impact on the
Voter’s expected current policy payoff is positive.
We conclude our analysis of judicial review’s effects
on the Voter’s current payoff by considering how the
Leader’selectoralambition(inverselymeasuredbyα),
the probability of a competent Leader (q), and the
ability of the Judge (γ) jointly affect the desirability of
judicial review:
Proposition 6.
a. Supposeq ∈

p−γ
p ,
p+γ−1
p

(i.e.,theprobabilitythe
Leader is of high ability is neither too small nor
too large) and the electoral strength function F is
concave. Then judicial review strictly increases the
Voter’scurrentpolicypayoffprovidedthatαissuf-
ﬁciently small (i.e., the Leader’s electoral ambition
is strong enough).43
b. Suppose α ≥ ¯ α (i.e., the Leader’s electoral ambi-
tion is sufﬁciently weak).44 Then review can never
increase the Voter’s current policy payoff. More-
over,whenq ≤
p−γ
p (i.e.,theprobabilitytheLeader
is of high ability is small enough), there exists a
strict equilibrium in which the Voter’s current pol-
icy payoff is strictly less than that with no review.
Part (a) establishes that when the Leader’s elec-
toral ambition is relatively large, conditions exist un-
der which judicial review strictly beneﬁts the Voter,
whereas part (b) establishes that when the Leader’s
electoral ambition is relatively weak, the Voter can
never beneﬁt from review and, in some instances, can
be harmed. The intuition for part (a) is as follows:
The concavity of F ensures that the legitimation ef-
fect dampens the low-ability Leader’s electoral incen-
tive to propose a = x. Thus, as long as the bailout ef-
fect is sufﬁciently small— –as will be the case when the
43 In addition, one can show that if F is concave and q ≥
p+γ−1
p ,
then the unique equilibrium is passive and review has no effect on
the Voter’s current policy payoff, regardless of α.
44 Recall from Proposition 1 that ¯ α≡
F(1)−F

pq
pq+(1−q)

2p−1+F(1)−F

pq
pq+(1−q)
.
Leader’s electoral ambition is strong— –active review
will decrease posturing and thus increase the Voter’s
current policy payoff relative to the case of no review.
Therequirementthatq ∈

p−γ
p ,
p+γ−1
p

ensuresthatin
any equilibrium the Judge both upholds and overrules
theLeaderwithpositiveprobability,sothelegitimation
effect of review is indeed operative. The intuition for
part (b) is a bit more straightforward: When electoral
ambition is weak, the low-ability Leader is a faithful
agentoftheVoter,sothereisnothingtobegainedfrom
judicial review. However, the supposition in part (b)
that q ≤
p−γ
p ensures the existence of strict equilibria,
which, if induced by review, result in the Voter losing
the beneﬁt of the high-ability Leader’s expertise. Thus,
when electoral ambition is low, the Voter is better off
withnoreviewifreviewinducesastrictequilibrium.In-
terestingly, part (b) points to the possibility that review
can be harmful even when it is likely that the Leader
is incompetent (q low). Notice that this is the case in
Figure 3, where review is harmful for low values of q,
but not for high values of q.45
Electoral Selection Effects
It is also important to consider how judicial review
affects the efﬁcacy of the electoral process in select-
ing competent Leaders, which affects the Voter’s long-
term welfare. Because we do not model future peri-
ods explicitly, we cannot provide a fully microfounded
analysis of how judicial review affects future welfare.
That said, our analysis permits the following observa-
tions: Most straightforward, if judicial review induces
a passive equilibrium, judicial review has no effect on
Voter learning. If judicial review induces a strict equi-
librium, then Voter learning is never better than in the
no review case. If there is no review, then the Voter
learns nothing from the Judge, but can at least learn
something from the Leader’s action (provided α > 0).
Under strict review, there is no helpful judicial signal,
and the competent and incompetent Leaders choose
the extraordinary action with identical probabilities,
making the Leader’s action uninformative. If judicial
review induces an equilibrium in which the Judge
sometimes follows her signal, then the result is more
complicated because such judicial review can affect
Voter learning via two distinct channels. First, when
the Judge follows her signal, then this conveys ad-
ditional information to the Voter; second, by chang-
ing the level of posturing, judicial review affects the
45 Proposition 6 might be taken as suggesting that judicial review is
valuable if (but only if) electoral ambition is sufﬁciently strong, and
that the case for judicial review strengthens as α decreases. How-
ever, there is no general relationship between the level of electoral
ambition and the effect of judicial review on the Voter’s current
policy payoff. Examples exist in which increasing electoral ambition
increases the beneﬁts of review, but examples also exist in which
increasing electoral ambition decreases the beneﬁts of review (see
the online Appendix). Thus, beyond the conditions established in
Proposition 6, we cannot offer simple policy prescriptions linking
electoral considerations (e.g., whether a politician is facing an immi-
nent election) to the desirability of judicial review.
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Voter’s ability to draw inferences directly from the
Leader’s action. If review has a minimal effect on the
low-ability Leader’s behavior, then judicial review in-
creasesVoterlearning;however,ifjudicialreviewhasa
substantial effect on the Leader’s behavior, then Voter
learning may be better or worse than in the no review
case.
It is important to emphasize that it is not necessarily
the case that if judicial review improves the Voter’s
expected current policy payoff, it also improves Voter
learning (or vice versa). Although these effects will
sometimes cut in the same direction— –favorable or un-
favorable to judicial review— –it is possible to construct
scenarios in which they cut in opposite directions.46
Therefore, institutional designers interested in assess-
ingthevalueofjudicialreviewasaninstitutionmustbe
attentive both to how judicial review affects policy out-
comes and to how it affects the efﬁcacy of the electoral
process in selecting high-quality political leaders. The
former consideration is familiar. The latter, however,
is often overlooked.
Additional Implications
The fact that the Judge in our model is rational and
cares about getting the policy right, coupled with the
fact for certain parameters judicial review leads to
worse expected policy outcomes, has intriguing impli-
cations for our understanding of “justiciability” doc-
trines (standing, political question, etc.). While there
areseveralplausibleexplanationsforwhyjudgeswould
devise doctrines to limit their ability to hear certain
cases, including the interests in reducing workload,
avoiding controversy, pursuing substantive objectives
surreptitiously, and controlling lower courts (e.g., Ho
and Ross 2010; Pierce 1999). Our analysis suggests an-
other possibility. Consider a situation in which judicial
review would worsen the Voter’s current expected pol-
icypayoff.Toﬁxideas,supposethatintroducingjudicial
review induces an active equilibrium in which judicial
screening does not offset the increased frequency with
which the low-ability Leader proposes extraordinary
action. Because the Judge shares the Voter’s policy
preferences, it follows that the Judge herself is worse
offthanshewouldbewithoutjudicialreview.Thisdoes
not mean the Judge is behaving irrationally in using
the active strategy— –given a high level of posturing, the
46 For instance, a scenario in which judicial review enhances the
Voter’s current policy payoff, yet hinders Voter learning, is the fol-
lowing: ﬁx α= 0.1, q = 0.2, p = 0.8, F(ˆ q) = ˆ q,a n dγ= 0.6. Then,
without review,π∗
norev ≈ 0.1451.Withreview,theunique equilibrium
is strict, where π∗
strict = 0.2. Although Voter learning is lower with
review, the Voter’s current policy payoff is higher. Speciﬁcally, the
Voter’s current policy payoff with review is 0.8, whereas without
review it is approximately 0.7703.
Judge is better off following her signal. However, if
the Judge could commit to uphold the Leader’s pro-
posal in all cases, posturing would decrease, and the
Judge would be better off from an ex ante perspective.
Whethersuchacommitmentcouldeverbecredibleisa
legitimate question, but one might plausibly interpret
certain justiciability doctrines as judicial attempts to
achieve such commitment.
Our model also helps illuminate debates concerning
the value of judicial competence (higher γ). A natural
conjecture is that if judicial review exists, the Voter
would always be better off with a more competent
Judge. Our model shows that this is not necessarily the
case. As γ increases, nonpassive review becomes more
attractive to the Judge relative to passive review. How-
ever, when the Judge employs a nonpassive strategy,
thepolicycosttothelow-abilityLeaderfromproposing
a = xislower.Thus,increasingtheJudge’scompetence
γ can increase the rate at which the low-ability Leader
erroneouslyproposesa = xwhenω = n.Ifthiseffectis
large enough, then increasing γ can reduce the Voter’s
current policy payoff, despite the fact that the Judge
has better information on which to base her rulings.47
This observation has implications for a variety of re-
form proposals that are intended to improve the qual-
ity of judicial review by, for example, facilitating judi-
cial specialization (Jordan 1981), selecting morejudges
with decision-relevant expertise (Vermeule 2007), fa-
cilitating judicial acquisition of outside expert advice
(Schauer 2001), and reorienting legal scholarship to
provide more information about the pragmatic conse-
quences of judicial decisions (Posner 1998). If reforms
along these lines increase γ, then the impact on the
quality of ﬁnal policy decisions might well be desir-
able in many cases. However, if these reforms induce a
formerly deferential judge to become active, then they
maysubstantiallyincreaseposturing,makingtheVoter
worse off.
CONCLUSION
Using a formal political agency model, we assess ju-
dicial review as a response to the concern that low-
ability leaders may “posture” by taking bold but ill-
advised policy initiatives in order to project a false
image of competence. Our analysis, although limited
in scope, generates a number of potentially useful
insights about the relationship between judicial re-
view and democratic performance. For instance, we
show that judicial review may increase or decrease this
sort of posturing, depending on the relative strength
of the “bailout” and “legitimation” effects of judicial
review, and that rational (and unbiased) judges will
only engage in active review if the level of posturing
47 AnexampleinwhichincreasingγreducestheVoter’scurrentpol-
icypayoffisthefollowing:ﬁxα= 0.2,q = 0.5,p = 0.8,andF(ˆ q) = ˆ q.
When γ= 0.501, the unique equilibrium is passive, π∗
pass ≈ 0.1195,
andtheVoter’scurrentpolicypayoffisapproximately0.8642.Incon-
trast,whenγ= 0.701,theuniqueequilibriumisactive,π∗
act ≈ 0.1517,
and the Voter’s current policy payoff is approximately 0.8626.
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is high enough but not too high. Our analysis also
produces a number of sometimes surprising compar-
ative statics predictions, including the ﬁnding that in-
creasingjudicialabilitymaysometimesdecreaserather
than increase the desirability of judicial review. More
generally, we derive conditions under which judicial
review may improve or worsen voter welfare through
a direct impact on policy outcomes and through an
indirect impact on electoral sorting.
Our analysis also predicts and provides a rationalist
explanation for a number of phenomena often associ-
ated with real world judicial systems, including judicial
deference, legal unpredictability, and judicially created
limitsonthecourts’ownjurisdiction.Thus,ouranalysis
is consistent with a recent trend in the literature that
seeks to enrich the dialogue between formal political
economy and traditional legal scholarship by illustrat-
inghowlong-standingdebatesaboutcontroversialfea-
tures of the legal system, including some thought to
be “internal” to legal doctrine, might be illuminated
by formal analysis of judges’ strategic interaction with
other actors (e.g., Bueno de Mesquita and Stephenson
2002; Lax n.d.)
Beyond these contributions, the larger objective of
this article is to help lay the groundwork for a research
program that would rigorously analyze the effect of
judicial review on democratic performance in a polit-
ical agency framework. Although we analyze judicial
review as a response to one particular sort of polit-
ical agency problem— –posturing— –future work might
examine judicial review as a possible response to other
pathologies that may arise, including the incentive of
elected leaders to “pander” by selecting popular poli-
cies, or to adopt policies that adversely affect certain
vulnerable minorities or are overly responsive to other
minorities(“specialinterests”).Futureworkmightalso
incorporate certain important concerns about judicial
review this article has bracketed, such as judicial bias.
More generally, the framework we develop here, when
combined with the emerging literature on separation-
of-powers between elected branches of government
(e.g., Fox and Van Weelden 2010; Persson, Roland,
and Tabellini 1997; Stephenson and Nzelibe 2010),
may facilitate direct comparisons between judicial and
political oversight of government decision making— –a
crucial issue in contemporary legal and policy debates,
which the extant political economy literature has not
fully engaged.
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